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there alone, that we find no weakness and no failure.

  Although the light of almost four centuries has been focused on "The

  Prince," its problems are still debatable and interesting, because

  they are the eternal problems between the ruled and their rulers. Such

  as they are, its ethics are those of Machiavelli's contemporaries; yet

  they cannot be said to be out of date so long as the governments of

  Europe rely on material rather than on moral forces. Its historical

  incidents and personages become interesting by reason of the uses

  which Machiavelli makes of them to illustrate his theories of

  government and conduct.

  Leaving out of consideration those maxims of state which still furnish

  some European and eastern statesmen with principles of action, "The

  Prince" is bestrewn with truths that can be proved at every turn. Men

  are still the dupes of their simplicity and greed, as they were in the

  days of Alexander VI. The cloak of religion still conceals the vices

  which Machiavelli laid bare in the character of Ferdinand of Aragon.

  Men will not look at things as they really are, but as they wish them

  to be--and are ruined. In politics there are no perfectly safe

  courses; prudence consists in choosing the least dangerous ones. Then

  --to pass to a higher plane--Machiavelli reiterates that, although

  crimes may win an empire, they do not win glory. Necessary wars are

  just wars, and the arms of a nation are hallowed when it has no other

  resource but to fight.

  It is the cry of a far later day than Machiavelli's that government

  should be elevated into a living moral force, capable of inspiring the

  people with a just recognition of the fundamental principles of

  society; to this "high argument" "The Prince" contributes but little.

  Machiavelli always refused to write either of men or of governments

  otherwise than as he found them, and he writes with such skill and

  insight that his work is of abiding value. But what invests "The

  Prince" with more than a merely artistic or historical interest is the

  incontrovertible truth that it deals with the great principles which

  still guide nations and rulers in their relationship with each other

  and their neighbours.

  In translating "The Prince" my aim has been to achieve at all costs an

  exact literal rendering of the original, rather than a fluent

  paraphrase adapted to the modern notions of style and expression.

  Machiavelli was no facile phrasemonger; the conditions under which he

  wrote obliged him to weigh every word; his themes were lofty, his

  substance grave, his manner nobly plain and serious. "Quis eo fuit

  unquam in partiundis rebus, in definiendis, in explanandis pressior?"

  In "The Prince," it may be truly said, there is reason assignable, not

  only for every word, but for the position of every word. To an

  Englishman of Shakespeare's time the translation of such a treatise

  was in some ways a comparatively easy task, for in those times the

  genius of the English more nearly resembled that of the Italian

  language; to the Englishman of to-day it is not so simple. To take a

  single example: the word "intrattenere," employed by Machiavelli to

  indicate the policy adopted by the Roman Senate towards the weaker

  states of Greece, would by an Elizabethan be correctly rendered

  "entertain," and every contemporary reader would understand what was

  meant by saying that "Rome entertained the Aetolians and the Achaeans

  without augmenting their power." But to-day such a phrase would seem

  obsolete and ambiguous, if not unmeaning: we are compelled to say that

  "Rome maintained friendly relations with the Aetolians," etc., using

  four words to do the work of one. I have tried to preserve the pithy

  brevity of the Italian so far as was consistent with an absolute

  fidelity to the sense. If the result be an occasional asperity I can

  only hope that the reader, in his eagerness to reach the author's

  meaning, may overlook the roughness of the road that leads him to it.

  The following is a list of the works of Machiavelli:

  Principal works. Discorso sopra le cose di Pisa, 1499; Del modo di

  trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati, 1502; Del modo tenuto

  dal duca Valentino nell' ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da

  Fermo, etc., 1502; Discorso sopra la provisione del danaro, 1502;

  Decennale primo (poem in terza rima), 1506; Ritratti delle cose dell'

  Alemagna, 1508-12; Decennale secondo, 1509; Ritratti delle cose di

  Francia, 1510; Discorsi sopra la prima deca di T. Livio, 3 vols.,

  1512-17; Il Principe, 1513; Andria, comedy translated from Terence,

  1513 (?); Mandragola, prose comedy in five acts, with prologue in

  verse, 1513; Della lingua (dialogue), 1514; Clizia, comedy in prose,

  1515 (?); Belfagor arcidiavolo (novel), 1515; Asino d'oro (poem in

  terza rima), 1517; Dell' arte della guerra, 1519-20; Discorso sopra il

  riformare lo stato di Firenze, 1520; Sommario delle cose della citta

  di Lucca, 1520; Vita di Castruccio Castracani da Lucca, 1520; Istorie

  fiorentine, 8 books, 1521-5; Frammenti storici, 1525.

  Other poems include Sonetti, Canzoni, Ottave, and Canti

  carnascialeschi.

  Editions. Aldo, Venice, 1546; della Tertina, 1550; Cambiagi, Florence,

  6 vols., 1782-5; dei Classici, Milan, 10 1813; Silvestri, 9 vols.,

  1820-2; Passerini, Fanfani, Milanesi, 6 vols. only published, 1873-7.

  Minor works. Ed. F. L. Polidori, 1852; Lettere familiari, ed. E.

  Alvisi, 1883, 2 editions, one with excisions; Credited Writings, ed.

  G. Canestrini, 1857; Letters to F. Vettori, see A. Ridolfi, Pensieri

  intorno allo scopo di N. Machiavelli nel libro Il Principe, etc.; D.

  Ferrara, The Private Correspondence of Nicolo Machiavelli, 1929.

  DEDICATION

  To the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De' Medici:

  Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are

  accustomed to come before him with such things as they hold most

  precious, or in which they see him take most delight; whence one

  often sees horses, arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and

  similar ornaments presented to princes, worthy of their greatness.

  Desiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with

  some testimony of my devotion towards you, I have not found among

  my possessions anything which I hold more dear than, or value so

  much as, the knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired by

  long experience in contemporary affairs, and a continual study of

  antiquity; which, having reflected upon it with great and

  prolonged diligence, I now send, digested into a little volume, to

  your Magnificence.

  And although I may consider this work unworthy of your

  countenance, nevertheless I trust much to your benignity that it

  may be acceptable, seeing that it is not possible for me to make a

  better gift than to offer you the opportunity of understanding in

  the shortest time all that I have learnt in so many years, and

  with so many troubles and dangers; which work I have not

  embellished with swelling or magnificent words, nor stuffed with

  rounded pe
riods, nor with any extrinsic allurements or adornments

  whatever, with which so many are accustomed to embellish their

  works; for I have wished either that no honour should be given it,

  or else that the truth of the matter and the weightiness of the

  theme shall make it acceptable.

  Nor do I hold with those who regard it as a presumption if a man

  of low and humble condition dare to discuss and settle the

  concerns of princes; because, just as those who draw landscapes

  place themselves below in the plain to contemplate the nature of

  the mountains and of lofty places, and in order to contemplate the

  plains place themselves upon high mountains, even so to understand

  the nature of the people it needs to be a prince, and to

  understand that if princes it needs to be of the people.

  Take then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in

  which I send it; wherein, if it be diligently read and considered

  by you, you will learn my extreme desire that you should attain

  that greatness which fortune and your other attributes promise.

  And if your Magnificence from the summit of your greatness will

  sometimes turn your eyes to these lower regions, you will see how

  unmeritedly I suffer a great and continued malignity of fortune.

  THE PRINCE

  CHAPTER I

  HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE,

  AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED

  All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have

  been and are either republics or principalities.

  Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been

  long established; or they are new.

  The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or

  they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the

  prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of

  the King of Spain.

  Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a

  prince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of

  the prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability.

  CHAPTER II

  CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES

  I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another

  place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only

  to principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated

  above, and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and

  preserved.

  I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary

  states, and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than

  new ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of

  his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise,

  for a prince of average powers to maintain himself in his state,

  unless he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force;

  and if he should be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister

  happens to the usurper, he will regain it.

  We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have

  withstood the attacks of the Venetians in '84, nor those of Pope

  Julius in '10, unless he had been long established in his dominions.

  For the hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend;

  hence it happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary

  vices cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his

  subjects will be naturally well disposed towards him; and in the

  antiquity and duration of his rule the memories and motives that make

  for change are lost, for one change always leaves the toothing for

  another.

  CHAPTER III

  CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES

  But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it

  be not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which,

  taken collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly

  from an inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities;

  for men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves,

  and this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules:

  wherein they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience

  they have gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural

  and common necessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those

  who have submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other

  hardships which he must put upon his new acquisition.

  In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in

  seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends

  who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in

  the way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against

  them, feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in

  armed forces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the

  goodwill of the natives.

  For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied

  Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it

  only needed Lodovico's own forces; because those who had opened the

  gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future

  benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is

  very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time,

  they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with

  little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish

  the delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself

  in the weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first

  time it was enough for the Duke Lodovico[*] to raise insurrections on

  the borders; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was

  necessary to bring the whole world against him, and that his armies

  should be defeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the

  causes above mentioned.

  [*] Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco Sforza, who

  married Beatrice d'Este. He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500,

  and died in 1510.

  Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second

  time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it

  remains to name those for the second, and to see what resources he

  had, and what any one in his situation would have had for maintaining

  himself more securely in his acquisition than did the King of France.

  Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an

  ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country

  and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold

  them, especially when they have not been accustomed to self-

  government; and to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed

  the family of the prince who was ruling them; because the two peoples,

  preserving in other things the old conditions, and not being unlike in

  customs, will live quietly together, as one has seen in Brittany,

  Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy, which have been bound to France for

  so long a time: and, although there may be some difference in />
  language, nevertheless the customs are alike, and the people will

  easily be able to get on amongst themselves. He who has annexed them,

  if he wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind two

  considerations: the one, that the family of their former lord is

  extinguished; the other, that neither their laws nor their taxes are

  altered, so that in a very short time they will become entirely one

  body with the old principality.

  But when states are acquired in a country differing in language,

  customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great

  energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real

  helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside

  there. This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has

  made that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other

  measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled

  there, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the

  spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy

  them; but if one is not at hand, they are heard of only when they are

  great, and then one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the

  country is not pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied

  by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have

  more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He

  who would attack that state from the outside must have the utmost

  caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested

  from him with the greatest difficulty.

  The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places,

  which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do

  this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A

  prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense

  he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority

  only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them

  to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and

  scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being

  uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not

  to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have

  been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not

  costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as

  has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one

  has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed,

  because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more

  serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a

  man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of

  revenge.

  But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends

  much more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the

  state, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are

  exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting

  of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and

  all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their

  own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such

  guards are as useless as a colony is useful.

  Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects

  ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful

  neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care

  that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a

  footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be

  introduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of

  ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were

  brought into Greece by the Aetolians; and in every other country where

  they obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And